Abstract

The Internet and related technology are being used to facilitate acts that could adversely impact national security. This use has been increasing at least as rapidly as the technology itself advances. The various government entities that are responsible for enforcing related law have been left behind in the digital arms race. Due to constraints of time, complexity, and resources, most crimes perpetrated in cyberspace go unpunished. A similar state of affairs existed long before the Internet was conceived. In that age a means was developed by which the authorities could exert power – through proxies - against malicious actors. What lessons can practitioners and policy-makers of today learn from the era of the buccaneers? Is privateering a viable way to reduce online lawlessness without turning the Internet into a digital police state?
Overview

Cyber threats are growing at a pace that exceeds the government’s ability to address them. Safety and security on the Internet is a national security issue. The Internet is a major component of our economy and a communications tool for both government and military messages. Key institutions like the FBI can’t provide basic information-age services to their agents yet those who are seeking respite from online threats continue to seek a governmental solution.

History tells us of another age, when national and economic might was based on sea power not CPU power. Far from the eyes of national authorities, pirates hijacked the precious cargoes sought by colonial powers. Nations that lacked a powerful naval force co-opted the resources and motivations of the larger and more powerful private sector. To counter the threat of piracy the counter-pirate – the privateer – was created. Armed and capable, privateers assumed responsibility for the martial and enforcement tasks that nation-states were unable to accomplish on their own.

Privateering in the computer security field could be an effective way to reduce the most serious cyber threats. Private institutions conducting national security work have both the resources and the motivation to make such a scheme work. Such an approach is not without complications. Important political and social issues must be considered, and the legal issues could very well prove to be insurmountable. Not every enterprise that suffers at the hands of digital miscreants is going to be worth a privateering effort and the nations which are most adversely impacted by malicious online activities are also those most likely to suffer consequences if the privateering approach were to get out of hand.

The State of Internet Security

From DOD-funded experiment to engine of modern commerce and government, the Internet is often envisioned as wonderland where free information liberates minds and solves world hunger. However, if anything is liberated in cyberspace it is as likely to be innocent people from their money (and amateur entertainers from their clothes) as it is to be minds from intellectual bondage. Concepts like Moore’s Law plot the rate at which related technology will advance, while ingenious concepts that address a real or

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2 The 1965 projection of Intel Corporation co-founder Dr. Gordon Moore that microprocessors will double in complexity - commonly interpreted as doubling in power - every two years.
imagined need end up exposing us to a new set of dangers. In this environment a great disparity exists between the ideal and the reality of cyberspace.

Consider that every year the Computer Security Institute and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts a cyber-crime survey. Many computer security practitioners consider the survey findings questionable, though not necessarily in a negative way. For starters, there is a significant difference between the number of surveys sent out and the number of surveys that are returned. This means that the sample being used to draw conclusions is only marginally representative of reality. It is also privately acknowledged that the numbers reported in such surveys – particularly by public firms – are intentionally tempered. There are more focused surveys that seek to document the financial losses brought about by cyber crime. The methodology behind some of these surveys is not always clear. Even when considering a problem of global significance some low-end estimates seem too fantastic for reality.

Since we have no widely accepted way of assessing the impact of cyber threats we are forced to draw the broadest conclusions in a round-about way. If cyberspace were not a generally lawless environment then the computer security market would not be measured in tens of billions of dollars\(^3\) and the demand for high caliber computer security practitioners would not be as high as it is.\(^4\)

Were the government able to effectively deal with cyber threats we should see conviction rates that roughly correspond to crime impact figures, yet the number of such prosecutions is astonishingly low. Like similar activity in the physical domain: only the dumb or greedy get caught.\(^5\) There are a number of reasons why convictions are so low, not the least of which is the lack of adequately trained government agents. Cyber crime units and forensics labs tend to be in major metropolitan areas or regional centers where the few experts in the area are pooled together for the sake of economy. Expertise is rare but the demand for such services is overwhelming, forcing labs to set parameters (often dollar-based) for case acceptance.

Other relevant issues are associated with time and jurisdiction. Without the right to conduct digital hot pursuit or even non-invasive police techniques, any trail left by criminals could be long gone by the time investigators arrive. Even if a trail is traced as


\(^5\) Had they not fallen for the FBI’s false pretense of a job offer, Russian hackers behind the CARDKEEPER case - Alexy Ivanov and Vasily Gorshkov - would likely have never been convicted.
far as can be within the boundaries of one country, a connection to a foreign computer could end any investigative action. If a foreign nation is willing to cooperate, it may also be hampered by resource constraints. Also, that nation may be just one hop in a long chain of connections. Other nations do not have corresponding cyber laws on the books, or ratified treaties that would enable cooperation.

There are only a few courses of action available when it comes to addressing cyber threats. The first is the maintenance of the status quo: victim hood. Note that organizations that deal with cyber threats all have “response” in their name and you will realize that computer security today is almost entirely reactive. The second course of action has the government building the capability to bring law and order to cyberspace. This is unlikely if for no other reason than the stateless nature of the Internet precludes exercising dominion by any single nation. Consider that the Department of Justice’s cyber crime budget for 2005 was projected to be roughly $300 million dollars and a similar program within Homeland Security’s was much less.\(^6\) Contrast cyber defense spending to the tens of billions of dollars malicious actors are estimated to be making and you will understand the priority cyber threat has on Capitol Hill.\(^7\)

The final option – outsourcing – has private-sector enterprises performing the tasks necessary to defend national interests online. Unlike the government the private sector has ample resources and a strong motivation to succeed: reducing threats means less risk which translates into higher profits.

**Yo, Ho, Ho and a Cache of RAM**

There was a time when the engine of commerce in the world was based on sea not CPU power. The bigger your naval force the greater a global power you tended to be. It was sea power that allowed expanding empires to seek out and plunder far-away lands. In addition to being finite, the precious resources craved by these nations were hard to get out of the ground. Eventually it became clear that a more economical approach would be to claim these resources after another party did all the investing and heavy lifting. To

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combat piracy nation-states leveraged private-sector resources to protect commerce and defend national interests at the same time. Thus was born the privateer.⁸

Given government authorization a privateer was in effect a covert operator who served as the eyes, ears, and fist of a sovereign when war and conflicts short of war were in play. For assuming risks on behalf of a sovereign the privateer was rewarded with a portion of the bounty taken from a defeated party, while the balance was delivered to the government as settlement for whatever grievance was being avenged.

The primary difference between a pirate and a privateer was sponsorship. A privateer had government sanction – a Letter or Marque or Letter of Reprisal – that was in effect a license to kill and steal.⁹ Pirates were outlaws and they received treatment as such if captured; privateers were proxy soldiers of a foreign government and if captured considered prisoners of war. This is not to say that all privateers were models of sea-faring propriety, since many were former (and once again future) pirates.

As with nearly every official solution to a given problem there was abuse. Over time Letters evolved into the Elizabethan equivalent of a “get rich quick” scheme for colonial governors, businessmen, and privateers. Crackdowns ensued and as the age of the Galleon waned so did the need for a privatized seaborne security force. Letters of Marque officially ceased to be valid instruments of national power with the signing of the Declaration of Paris in 1856.¹⁰

The More Things Change . . .

You have a freely navigable environment in which both nations and private concerns can operate. Throughout this environment there are finite resources being fought over by rivals whose capabilities vary widely. Despite the existence of a patchwork of laws, customs and practices, as a whole it is an anarchic environment that cannot be effectively and uniformly governed. Am I describing the ocean-centric world of the 17th century or the Internet-centric world of the 21st? Aside from the nature of the technology involved, is there a meaningful difference? Given the parallels is it

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⁸ The author thanks M.J. Tempest, CAPT, USNR (Ret) and 1LT Brian C. McClain, US Army, for freely sharing their knowledge and insights on the age of piracy.
⁹ Issued by a sovereign and later colonial governors a Letter of Marque gave a privateer license to attack the ships of nations hostile to the issuing authority until the Letter was revoked or hostilities were over; Merchantmen who lost a ship to a foreign navy or privateer could be issued Letters of Reprisal; essentially a license to reclaim stolen property, though the prize (ship) taken might not have been the actual ship lost.
¹⁰ A treaty not ratified by the US.
unreasonable to assume that the solution developed to solve these problems centuries ago would not also work to resolve its modern counterpart?

There is no exact equivalent of the privateer in modern life. No government sanctions private actors to wage war on another state (at least not publicly). There are a number of examples that come close though the parallels are inexact. The modern day bounty hunter is one such example. A private citizen operating under the auspices of a bond agent, the bounty hunter has more liberty to act in certain ways than law enforcement officers. Their mission however, is to deliver alleged criminals to court, not avenge crimes or fight wars.

The Private Military Corporation (PMC) is another close example, but such firms do not engage in combat on behalf of one government against another. PMCs make a point of distancing themselves from the term “mercenary” in part because the employment of mercenary forces is illegal under international law. Their limited focus precludes the labeling of PMCs as modern-day privateers in the strictest sense.

The Business Software Alliance (BSA) is another close parallel. The BSA is a private entity funded by software firms. It gathers information about enterprises that use and traffic in pirated software. While entities like the BSA may assist in the enforcement of the law, their primary goal is to help private enterprise, not national security in any direct sense.

From a sheer numbers perspective tapping private capabilities makes perfect sense. The number of computer security practitioners in just one large commercial firm likely equals the federal workforce dedicated to fighting cyber threats. The situation was not much different in US colonial times as privateers outnumbered colonial navy ships by 26-to-1. It isn’t that our security and law enforcement agencies are neglecting cyber threats because they don’t consider them important, but in an age of kinetic terrorism some decisions make themselves.

A Framework for Computer Security Swashbuckling

11 The UK-based PMC Sandline was hired by the government of Sierra Leone to put down an insurgency, which is indeed combat, but not war against another state.
In a notional world where cyber threats were dealt with by computer security privateers, a framework of principles would need to be established. The issuance of a Letter would have to be predicated on some minimum, specific, and verifiable criteria. For starters there has to be a reasonable belief that the perpetrators of a malicious act have placed the nation at risk.\textsuperscript{14} This could include the theft of data from a federal interest computer system, or interfering with the networks of the critical infrastructure. Details may vary but the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn by the action in question is that someone is seeking to undermine our national security.\textsuperscript{15} Additional principles to be applied include:

- Principle of Self-Help: Reasonable and timely defensive steps have to have been taken prior to the event (e.g. properly configured firewalls, up to date on patches, etc.).
- Principle of Proportionality: Actions must be equal to or less than the actions taken by the perpetrator.
- Principle of Sovereign Control: Nations participating in a privateering regime have to have adequate controls on when and how privateering can be used.
- Principle of Qualification: Privateers must demonstrate a minimum level of competence and a means by which competence can be verified (read: certification).

Complicating Factors

Most complicating factors associated with privateering are legal in nature. I am neither a lawyer nor do I attest that what follows is a comprehensive treatment of pertinent law. I hit a few high points to illustrate just how complicated this can be from even a 50,000-foot view.

Past attempts to impose an international legal regime for cyber threats made a number of flawed assumptions.\textsuperscript{16} The first is that national laws would be readily altered to bring a nation into compliance with an international regime. Unfortunately, what constitutes

\textsuperscript{14} In order to portray a world with a privatized computer security regime it is necessary to suspend a certain amount of disbelief. A variety of broad assumptions about changes to existing laws and policies have to be made in this notional example, though in interest of brevity they are not all explicitly stated.

\textsuperscript{15} Attribution of such action is something of a holy grail in the computer security field, and a topic that is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that the utility of certain types of information are limited to those who can make best use of it. Proxies may be used for acquisition, but the serious work is done in someone’s Ministry by government employees.

a crime in one nation may be viewed quite differently in another. There is no disputing
the fact that the “I Love You” worm had a serious impact on information systems in the
US, yet the Filipino author of the worm has yet to answer for his actions. In the US we
revile spam and pop-ups, but in some corners of the world such techniques may be
considered protected speech or simple commerce.

The second flaw is that ratification somehow fixes the law enforcement capability
problem. Recall our earlier discussion on the dearth of government-employed cyber
crime professionals in the technically advanced US and then extrapolate downward.
Better yet try to envision the effectiveness of a joint US, UK, German, Estonian,
Peruvian and Bhutanese investigation.17

Third, some nations may be unwilling to assist in all investigations. Indeed one nation’s
clandestine digital espionage program may very well look like the work of hackers: if it
is not actually carried out by hackers. Any adversary or erstwhile ally can claim with
great indignity that evidence of a break-in that points to their nation is the work of
digital malcontents and not a government sponsored activity; “Mon Dieu! Have you not
heard of the fallacy of the ‘last hop’?”

Let us also not forget that progression along the international legal front can be glacial,
which would be fine if the impact of realized threats was not growing by orders of
magnitude. At this point we could argue that national cyber security is something of an
illusion, in which case we have the opportunity to invoke a right that we never officially
abrogated:

“Congress shall have power to . . . Declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”18

Conclusions

Computer security privateering is certainly a provocative idea. It is easy to get carried
away with romantic imagery – and milk nautical metaphors to excess - and belay the
fact that this is a course of action that could have serious repercussions if not carefully
managed. Privateering is arguably the most economical, technically feasible and
historically relevant approach to the problem. Despite serious legal hurdles,
privateering is precedence, and where is precedence valued more than in the law?

17 With all due respect to the Bhutanese cyber crime squad.
18 Cornell Law School, “US Constitution, Article I, Section 8” law.cornell.edu; available from
Taking no serious action to bring order to cyberspace is always an option. We are so used to the current state of affairs that unless people start dying because of cyber attacks some may consider it the safest course of action to pursue.

The standard response to a problem of this nature - a large and powerful government enforcement capability - is unlikely. The excessive cost and lack of political will are but two key mitigating factors. As this paper was being drafted much was being made of online government surveillance programs. While few people polled took issue with these programs, the attitude of the electorate might change considerably if a massive digital police force patrolling cyberspace were being proposed. People don’t mind the innocuous glance; they take great umbrage with the prolonged and unwarranted stare.

Privateering really only makes sense for institutions supporting critical infrastructure and national defense; they (and by extension the nation) have the most to lose, the most qualified resources, and can most easily meet proposed compliance requirements. Patently unfair? Perhaps, but since we will never be fully rid of cyber threats, reducing them to the point where they are mere irritants is a far cry better than the status quo.

Privateering would require a strong, independent and transparent mechanism for validating activity since the potential for abuse would be strong. There is no shortage of events that could potentially qualify for privateer action, so much so that there will probably be a temptation over time to make the language in Letters more ambiguous or to issue a “blanket” Letter that takes responsibility for deciding when to act out of the hands of the government.

Ocean-going piracy today is a trifling problem that has achieved some notoriety of late following events off the coasts of Somalia and in Southeast Asia. No one calls for a force of privateers to combat these belligerents because they are no match for even commercial cruise ships. The point to take away is that piracy in the physical world is essentially a nuisance; privateering in cyberspace is one way to reduce threats so as to achieve the same goal.

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